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Lecturer, Department of Law, University of Botswana
INTRODUCTION
Section 149(1) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act1 gives the court discretion to 
allow amendments to be made in the indictment or summons at any time before judgements 
if it considers that such amendment will not prejudice the accused in his defence. It provides:
Whenever, on the trial of any indictment or summons, there appears to be any variance 
between the statement therein and evidence offered in proof of such statement, or if it 
appears that any words or particulars that ought to have been inserted in the indictment 
or summons have been omitted, or that there is any other error in the indictment or 
summons the court may at any time before judgment, if it considers that the making 
of the necessary amendment in the indictment or summons will not prejudice the 
accused in his defence, order that the indictment or summons be amended, so far as it 
is necessary, by some officer of the court or other person, both in that part thereof 
where the variance, omission, insertion, or error occurs, and in every other part thereof 
which it may become necessary to amend.
The general rule is that an amendment of a summons should be done before the accused 
pleads and not during reading of judgement or delivery thereof.2 However, in terms of this 
section, amendment may be applied for and granted at any time before judgement.
Notwithstanding the seemingly clear language of section 149(1) the extent of the power to 
amend conferred by this section has been the subject of conflicting decisions of the High 
Court.
The controversy has centred on what constitutes an "amendment" within the subsection. 
This paper seeks to analyse the judicial views expressed on the subsection and to ascertain 
which one is appropriate in the absence of a definitive opinion of the Court of Appeal.
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE SUBSECTION
Two views seem to have emerged from the case law. Some judges have been of the opinion 
that the word "am end" can and does include substituting an existing charge with a new 
one, while others were of the view that where an amendment had the effect of substituting 
a new charge then it was invalid for it went beyond the meaning of the word "amend".
An exponent of the second view is Justice Corduff who expressed the view, in State v Lephole,3 
that the section only provides for certain amendments to the particulars to bring the charge 
into line with evidence. He expressed himself thus:
1.
2 .
C ap 08:02 1987 Rev.
Hlupekile v  The State (1982)1 BLR 134.
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Nowhere in the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act is a court empowered to 
substitute an entirely new charge for the one to which an accused has pleaded.
Section 1484 provides only for certain amendments to the particulars to bring the charge 
into line with the evidence subject to certain safeguards.5
This dictum was made in an appeal where the accused was originally charged with rape 
but during trial evidence pointed or so the presiding magistrate believed, to indecent assault. 
By section 191 of the then Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act6 7the court is empowered 
to find an accused guilty of a lesser offence when charged with rape. The trial magistrate 
invoked provisions of this section and ordered substitution of the charge of rape for indecent 
assault. The court quashed the conviction and set aside the sentence meted out against 
appellant. The court held that,
the substitution of a charge of indecent assault was in the present case a grave 
irregularity.
Again in State v Thekiso,1 relying on the Zimbabwean case of State v Moyo,8 Justice Corduff 
observed that,
The nature and extent of amendments which are permissible in terms of section 148 
are limited and while what can be done in any case will depend upon the particular 
situation obtaining in that case the general rule is that there must not be a new charge 
substituted for the one to which the accused pleaded.9
In State v Moyo accused was charged with theft of stock. He pleaded guilty. The prosecutor 
accepted the plea and tendered to the Magistrate a statement of agreed facts. This was read 
over to the accused who, in reply, claimed that he had been compelled by terrorists on pain 
of death to steal the cattle. The magistrate altered the plea to not guilty. Thereupon the 
prosecutor advised that he intended to charge the accused with 14 counts of theft of stock 
in substitution for the charge before the court. Later the accused appeared before another 
Magistrate, who was aware that a plea of not guilty had been entered. In spite of such 
knowledge he permitted the prosecutor to put to the accused an entirely new charge which 
alleged the commission of 14 counts of theft of stock. He was asked to plead, and reiterated 
that he had stolen the cattle under compulsion. Pleas of not guilty were entered. He was 
convicted on all counts.
On review of the case the issue was whether an 'amendment' whereby a charge to which 
an accused had pleaded is substituted with an entirely new one was competent. Justice 
Gubbay observed that the amendment contemplated by section 19110 must be an amendment 
to the charge not the substitution o f an entirely new charge (Emphasis mine). The conviction 
and sentence were overturned.
4. Now s.149(1) 1987 Rev.
5. Supra N.3 at 217.
6. Cap 08:02 1973 Rev. (Now s.192 1987 Rev.).
7. 1981 BLR 267.
8. 1979(1) SA 1024.
9. Supra N. 7 at 235.
10. Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act Chap 59.
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Similarly in the South African case of R v Muyekwa" Lewis J. held that the substitution of 
one offence for another was not an amendment. In this case the accused had pleaded guilty 
to a charge of common assault. During the crown case and in view of the evidence led by 
the crown, the prosecutor applied for an amendment of a charge of assault with intent to 
do grievous bodily harm. The Magistrate allowed the amendment and the accused was 
convicted on the new charge. Lewis J. held that the so-called amendment of the charge was 
not an amendment within the meaning of the Act12 but that "it was the substitution of an 
entirely new charge which was not competent".
The interpretation of section 149 preferred by Corduff was adopted and followed by Justice 
Barrington Jones in Monyamane v The State13 where he quashed the conviction and set aside 
the decision of the trial court on the basis that "the procedure adopted by the learned 
magistrate resulted in a serious irregularity" .u
In that case the trial court had allowed the changing of a charge of indecent assault to that 
of rape. In his Lordship's view, if during trial the prosecution realises that the indictment 
or charge sheet does not cover all the criminal conduct of the accused and wishes to add 
more charges against the accused, then the proper course that should be followed is for the 
prosecutor to seek leave to withdraw the case in terms of the proviso to the then section 
2491s 0f fjjg Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act at the time when the application is made 
to substitute the charge, and then lay fresh charge against the accused.
Hannah J. expressed the contrary view in State v Kgatto.16 He expressed the view that while 
it is correct that for there to be an amendment there must be some existing thing which is 
the subject of correcting, it does not mean that the substitution of a new charge for the 
original necessarily falls outside the scope of the word 'amend '.17 Justice Hannah adverted 
his mind to the Zimbabwean High Court decisions in the cases of State v Moyo18 (already 
discussed above) and State v Colletw in which an appeal was allowed against an amendment 
which changed a charge of common assault to one of assault with intent to do grievous 
harm. He particularly noted the statement by the court in this case to the effect that,
not every alteration, particularly one that causes the complete destruction of the 
'existing thing' or its substitution by something else, can properly be deemed an 
amendment.20
His Lordship then considered the English authorities, which deal with the court's  
jurisdiction to amend an indictment. The power is contained in section 5(1) of the Indictment 
Act of 1915, which reads:
11. 1947 (4) SA 433.
12. Sec 225 of Act 31 of 1917.
13. 1985 BLR 230.
14. Ibid, at p 235.
15. Now section 150.
16. 1981 BLR 186.
17. Ibid, at p 191.
18. Supra note 8.
19. 1978 (4) SA 324.
20. S v Kgano 1981 BLR 186 at 191.
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where before trials or at any stage of a trial, it appears to the court that the indictment 
is defective, the court shall make such order for the amendment of the indictment as 
the court thinks necessary to meet the circumstances of the case, unless having regard 
to the merits of the case, the required amendments cannot be made without injustice, 
and may make such order as to the payment of any costs incurred owing to the necessity 
for amendment as the court thinks fit.
In the English case of R v Johal and Lam21 the court held that;
in the judgement of this court, there is no rule of law which precludes amendment of 
an indictment after arraignment either by addition of a new count or otherwise.
In R v Radley22 three additional counts of conspiracy had been added by way of amendment 
at the end of the prosecution case.
Having considered both the Zimbabwean and South African authorities on the one hand 
and English authorities on the other, Hannah observed obiter that to interpret section 149(1) 
in the way our courts did was to state the position rather too widely.23 In this case Hannah 
J. did not conclusively state the position of the law. The case was decided on other 
considerations rather than on the basis whether the changing of the charge of supplying or 
procuring something knowing it was intended to be unlawfully used to procure a 
miscarriage to administering drugs or other noxious thing with intent to procure a 
miscarriage.
In Amogelang v The State24 Hannah confronted the issue head-on. After a comprehensive 
examination of both Zimbabwean and South African authorities he came to the conclusion 
that the power of amendment conferred by section 149 (1) includes the power to substitute 
charges.
The question that arises is why this divergence of opinion in the first place? A closer look 
at the cases suggests that divergence of opinion on this point seems to have arisen because 
one view relied on similar provisions in section 5(1) of the English indictment Act of 1915 
and the other on the South African and Zimbabwean equivalents to section 149(1).
In his review of the authorities in Amogelang v The State Hannah J. was fortified in his view  
by saying:
I am influenced in reaching this conclusion firstly by the similarity between section 
149(1) of our Act and section 5(1) of the English Indictments Act, 1915 . . .  Although 
section 5(1) speaks in general terms of a defective indictment whereas section 149(1) 
particularises a number of instances when an amendment may be made the section 
then deals with the matter in a general way stating: or that there is any other error in 
the indictment or summons.
He concluded,
To my mind, in this context error or defect are of similar meaning and effect and the 
circumstances in which an amendment may be made are as wider under section 149(1) 
as they are under its English counterpart. I respectfully disagree with the narrow 
interpretation placed upon the section by Corduff J. in State v Lephole,25
21. (1972) 56 Cr. Appeal R. 348.
22. 1974 58 Cr. Appeal R. 394.
23. Supra note 20 at 191.
24. 1984 BLR 201.
25. (1979) BLR 215 at p 217.
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His Lordship expressed the view that there was a fundamental difference between section 
149(1) and its South African and Zimbabwean counterparts. In the South African equivalent 
the power to amend is in relation to a charge and the Zimbabwean equivalent also refers to 
a charge whilst under section 149(1) it is in relation to an indictment or a summons.
A 'charge' consists of statement of offence and particulars thereof while indictment refers 
to the whole document. In his view this difference is a vital one because while the addition 
of a new charge to an original charge could be said to be supplying a vacuum with something 
that should already have been there and thus goes beyond the meaning of the word 'amend' 
in the sense of the perfecting or ameliorating of an existing thing, the addition of a new 
charge does not have the same effect. The indictment or summons has been in existence 
from the outset of the trial and the addition of a new count cannot be said to be merely 
perfecting or correcting the indictment. The destruction of the count by the substitution of 
another does not destroy the indictment. The concept of indictment is far wider than that 
of a charge. Using this logical reasoning Hannah J. arrived at the conclusion that the 
interpretation to be placed on section 149(1) is that which is placed on its English equivalent.
Once Hannah J.'s reasoning is appreciated it becomes clear therefore that the South African 
and Zimbabwean authorities were not immediately relevant for they interpreted the word 
'amend' in the context of a charge and not an indictment.
The Court of Appeal has not yet intervened in this controversy so that it is likely that we 
will continue to see conflicting decisions over the interpretation of section 149(1) and the 
loser is our criminal justice system and indeed the accused who would be perturbed by 
like cases being treated differently. The situation cries out for court of appeal intervention.
COURT OF APPEAL’S INTERVENTION: WHICH WAY?
It is trite law that where the trial court has discretionary power the court of appeal is not 
entitled to substitute their discretion for that of the court of trial.26 The court can only 
interfere in cases where the court of trial had exceeded its jurisdiction or imposed a sentence, 
(in matters relating sentencing) which was not legally permissible for a crime or been 
influenced by facts or motives which were not appropriate for consideration. 27
The question under consideration does not interrogate the discretionary powers of courts 
of trial; that is not in dispute. What is at issue is whether the word 'amend' as used in 
section 149(1) should be given a narrower or broader meaning, that is, should the word 
'amend' in the context of section 149(1) be interpreted to mean not only the perfecting of a 
charge but also the substitution or addition of new charges?
The arguments of Hannah J. are to a large extent very attractive taking into account the fact 
that our criminal procedure law is fashioned largely along the English system hence the 
similarity in the provisions of our Act and its English equivalent. However, constitutional 
argument can be raised to support a narrower interpretation.
The Constitution of Botswana requires that a person charged with a criminal offence must 
be informed as soon as reasonably practicable, in a language that he understands and in
26. Ntsompe Shoto and Others v R. 1960 HCTLR 1. See also Motsekae Motjolobeka v R 1955 HCTLR 19.
27. Ibid., p 2.
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detail, of the nature of the offence charged.2* It further requires that the accused be given 
adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence.28 9 One could then ask whether 
a situation where a person is charged with assault and brought to court to answer to that 
charge is then told that instead of assault in fact now has to answer to a charge of rape is in 
compliance with the Constitution? Or whether where during trial the prosecutor applies 
for leave to amend and he substitutes the offence of assault for rape is in consonance with 
the Constitution?
It is submitted that interpretation which gives a narrower meaning to the word 'amend' 
will be more in consonance with the Constitution in that it does not permit surprises for 
the accused who is brought to court.
It is submitted that a better procedure is the one advanced by Barrington Jones J. that if 
during trial the prosecution realises that the indictment or charge sheet does not cover all 
the criminal conduct of the accused and wishes to add more charges against him, then the 
prosecutor must seek leave to withdraw the case and then lay fresh charges against the 
accused. It is submitted that accused must be acquitted of the charges previous alleged.
In conclusion it is submitted that while Hannah J.'s reasoning is quite attractive the court 
of appeal should have regard to constitutional requirements in the administration of criminal 
justice and be persuaded to adopt a narrower interpretation of section 149(1).
28. Section 10(1) (b).
29. Ibid. 10(1) (c).
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